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The Honorable James L. Robertson* 
 
In Memory of Roy D. Campbell, Jr., long-time President of the Board of 
Trustees, Greenville Municipal Separate School District, and who gave his 
all to preserve and promote public education in Mississippi. 
 
I. READIN’, RIGHTIN’ AND ‘RITHMETIC –  
GOING ON MISSISSIPPI’S THIRD CENTURY 
 
 Here follows a bit more than a once over lightly of one state’s 
ongoing endeavors at equipping its people with the learning and 
understanding they reasonably need that each may enjoy – in his or her 
continued social existence on this increasingly complex planet – a bit richer 
experience than their forbears had, to the end of a public order of human 
dignity for all.  
 There is a sense in which our story begins at statehood, December 
1817.  And not necessarily in the schoolhouse.  We have been taught by so 
many worthy and enlightened men and women, one and all. 
In 1818, at the very first term of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, 
Judge Joshua Giles Clarke sufficiently understood the humanity of each 
being on state soil – and of the law – that he decreed freedom for slaves 
who had been sold down the River from southwestern Indiana.1  Judge 
Clarke never had much formal schooling.  Yet he found and taught a core 
truth that by 1857 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney of the Supreme Court of 
the United States could not understand.2     
 
    * James L. Robertson is a graduate of Harvard Law School, a former Justice 
on the Supreme Court of Mississippi, author of Heroes, Rascals and the Law; 
Constitutional Encounters in Mississippi History (2019); author of Constitutional Law, a 
500 plus page exposition of Mississippi constitutional law and practice, Chapter 19, 
Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law (Third Edition, 2020); and has been a citizen of 
Mississippi since July 30, 1940. The author expresses his appreciation for the competent 
and diligent assistance of James “Bud” Sheppard, Sonya Dickson, Seth Curren, Keeton 
Thach, Melanie Mitchell, and Mississippi College School of Law Professor Donald 
Campbell. 
    1. Harry and Others v. Decker & Hopkins, Walker (1 Miss.) 36, 1818 
WL1235 (1818); see Robertson, Heroes, Rascals, and the Law; Constitutional 
Encounters in Mississippi History, chapter 2 (2019). 
    2. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691, 1856 U.S. 
Lexis 472, 1856 WL 8721 (1857). 
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 In 1950, Mississippi’s Nobel Laureate William Faulkner taught us 
the insight that “the past is never dead.  In fact, it’s not even past.”3  Most 
of us have needed a schoolhouse and a good American lit teacher to get 
through that one. 
 Dr. Arthur C. Guyton graduated from University High School in 
Oxford in 1936, a teacher all of his life, primarily at the University of 
Mississippi Medical School.  In 1956, Dr. Guyton published his still widely 
used Textbook of Medical Physiology.  
 Myres Smith McDougal was born in 1906 in rural Prentiss County.  
By the time he passed into history, Mac had lit and illuminated “the guiding 
light of a preferred future world public order of human dignity,”4 and even 
introduced the polemics of Space Law to the University of Mississippi.  
 Ida B. Wells was a native of Holly Springs, Mississippi, an educator 
and journalist who was a founding member of the N.A.A.C.P. and a 
crusading teacher, railing against lynching, which for decades was a 
scourge throughout much of the state. 
 Eudora Welty was a Pulitzer Prize winning author, with novels such 
as The Optimist’s Daughter plus many short stories, still taught in 
Mississippi’s schools and across the country. 
 And the list could go on and on.  
No one can function effectively within today’s nuanced and 
complex society without far more than basic competence in reading, 
writing, and arithmetic.  Or, for that matter, without knowing well what data 
processing is all about. Reading newspapers and other publications is 
important, but being able to understand instructions and regulations for this 
activity or that is more important, if not crucial.  Comprehending and 
working with more than just simple arithmetic are necessary for everyday 
consumer or other business transactions, accessible tax principles, rules of 
the road, the delineation of landlines, and much, much more.    
 No informed person today doubts that knowledge is power. 
“Informed,” that is, but at the very least, by a competent high school 
education.  Before one casts a vote for an important public office, he or she 
should know and understand what it means that knowledge is power.5 
 The above persons and preliminary perspectives before us, this 
endeavor into education in Mississippi begins with its Historical Context.  
Each of the state’s four constitutions has addressed the matter of education 
 
    3. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 80 (1927). 
    4. W. Michael Reisman, et al., The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 
32 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007),   
    5. See “Knowledge is Power,” in Yuval Noah Harari’s popular book, Sapiens 
– A Brief History of Mankind, 259-264 (2015). Much of Harari’s book would serve well 
as a text for an upper high school level course in world history.  
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and its necessity for quality of life and enriching our understanding of 
humanity.  Free Public Schools have long been and remain the core 
component and cornerstone of the state’s effort at fulfilling the 
responsibility it has accepted for the education of its people.  
 Yet, the struggle continues.  We must remain vigilant. We still have 
to fight the good fight. 
In 1997, the state established the Mississippi Adequate Education 
Program (MAEP), which, with adjustments over time, still supplies the 
framework for the state’s program for public education.  An outline of 
public education's financial dimensions follows, given that the practical 
reality of inadequate financing imperils the whole system.  More 
particularly, several citizen-sponsored resorts to the constitutional and legal 
system to achieve full funding came up short.  These efforts that adequate 
funding be provided remain important components of the history and future 
of public education in Mississippi.  Then twenty-one school districts 
brought an important adequate funding suit, which in 2017, sadly and 
arguably erroneously, was rejected by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. 
 The Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust is described and 
explained below.  This was perhaps the earliest source of funding for free 
public education in Mississippi.  A misstep by federal land offices in 1832 
impaired this program for many years.  Other mismanagement has been 
corrected so that this program is now of considerable value for the state’s 
public schools.  Section 206 of the state constitution authorizes local school 
districts to make special assessments to support their educational endeavors 
in a program that had to be righted by litigation in 2012. 
 Educational stratagems of more recent vintage go well beyond the 
opportunities available to those Mississippi children born in the late 
Twentieth Century.  Most of these more current concerns are presented and 
discussed below. These include charter schools and voucher systems.  
 Religion in Public Schools and related issues are presented and 
discussed, followed by more secular considerations of LGBTQ issues.  
Arguably, these should be considered together with racial desegregation 
beginning in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education,6 presented and 
discussed in the latter part of the Historical Context section, which follows 
below. 
 Finally, and arguably to come full circle, there is the comeback 
being made by those parents who would home school their children.  This 
legislatively authorized practice is presented and discussed, along with 
relevant regulations.   Our end remains a preferred future world public order 
of human dignity for each and all. 
 
    6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT7 
 
 All four Mississippi constitutions have exalted the long-term 
purpose and goal of a well-educated citizenry.  Back in 1817, the State’s 
original constitution-makers proclaimed that 
 
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good 
government, the preservation of liberty, and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education, shall forever 
be encouraged in this State.8     
 
An identical clause appeared in the Jacksonian Democracy Constitution of 
1832.9  
The preambles to these constitutional aspirations were tempered by 
identical freedom of religion clauses,10 hardly unfamiliar given the 
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses in the First Amendment to the U. 
S. Constitution, ratified on December 15, 1791.  Of late, “religion” — that 
first word in the education clauses of the first two state constitutions — has 
taken a bit of a back seat among some, as people have become more secular, 
or at least more accustomed to the removal of religious practices and 
artifacts from public places, such as public schools.11  And, as well, from 
public funding for sectarian entities and their activities. 
 In 1985, the Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted the public 
policy premise that the right of each child to a “minimally adequate public 
education” through and including high school “is one we can only label 
fundamental.”12  It is not without significance that, when the legislature 
 
    7. See John Winkle’s, The Mississippi State Constitution 125-135 (2d ed. 
2014), which provides a brief once-over-lightly of Miss. Const. art. VIII, Education, and 
its history.  
    8. MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (1817). This wording is a slightly improved 
version of Article 3 of the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787. See City of Corinth v. 
Robertson, 87 So. 464, 465 (Miss. 1921).   
    9. MISS. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (1832). 
  10. MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 4 (1817); MISS. CONST. Art. VI, §§ 3, 4 (1832).    
  11. See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (proscribing Christian and 
other religious prayer in public schools); and Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (proscribing Bible reading in public schools). Still, there are those 
who fight back, and cleverly so. See, e.g., the Mississippi Student Religious Liberties Act 
of 2013. MISS. CODE §§ 37-12-1 thru -13. This new law seeks to implement the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, to the careful 
avoidance of the lightning rod commands of the Establishment Clause. 
  12. See Hinds Cty. Sch. Dist. v. R. B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d 387, 399, 402 
(¶¶ 31, 39) (Miss. 2009); Pascagoula Mun. Sch. Dist. v. T. H., 681 So. 2d 110, 114 
(Miss. 1996); Clinton Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985), 
accepted in Uni. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Hughes, 765 So.2d 528, 539 (¶39) (Miss. 2000). 
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enacted the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate Education Program 
Act of 1997 [MAEP], “minimally” did not appear as a qualifier 
immediately before “Adequate Education.”13 
 More broadly, promoting education has been a national priority 
almost from day one in the life of the new nation, in its gradually growing 
maturity and entirety.  Support for public schools for many years was in 
substantial part provided via revenues generated by—and uses afforded 
by—sixteenth section lands, held by the State of Mississippi in trust, and 
from statehood.  The U. S. Congress so provided ab initio in the Northwest 
Territory Ordinance of 1785,14 which reserved the centerpiece sixteenth 
section, or 1/36th, of each township of public land, for the use and benefit 
of public schools.15 Mississippi’s story has been complicated by what 
happened regarding roughly the State’s northern 23 counties—more or less 
from Coahoma County bordering The River on the west, to Monroe County 
and thence to Alabama on the east, and northerly therefrom to the 
Tennessee state line. In these areas, the U. S. Land Office neglected to hold 
back the sixteenth sections when it sold off to the public the lands “ceded” 
to the Jacksonian iteration of the federal government by the Chickasaw 
Nation via the one-sided Treaty of Pontotoc Creek in October of 1832.16 
 At statehood in December of 1817, title to and control of the new 
state’s sixteenth sections and other school lands were donated by and 
otherwise derived from Georgia, whereupon—as noted—that title became 
vested in the State of Mississippi, in trust for the use and benefit of the 
respective counties.17  Local school authorities and school children have 
 
  13. MISSISSIPPI ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADEQUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM ACT 
of 1997, Miss. Laws ch. 612, § 2 (1997), codified as MISS. CODE § 37-151-1, et seq.; see 
particularly § 37-151-5(a).  
  14. See Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1785, 1 Laws of U. S. 565; the story 
of the school lands trust is told in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 267-75 (1986); 
Papasan v. United States, 756 F.2d 1087, 1089-1091 (5th Cir. 1985); and Hill v. 
Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 4-7 (Miss. 1989). 
  15. This story is summarized in John Winkle’s, The Mississippi State 
Constitution 131-133 (2d ed. 2014); with slightly varying versions told in Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1986); Turney v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Educ., 481 So. 2d 
770, 783-85 (Miss. 1985); Bd. of Educ. of Lamar Cty. v. Hudson, 588 So. 2d 683, 685-
86 (Miss. 1991).   
  16. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 270-272, 294-295 (1986); City 
of Corinth v. Robertson, 87 So. 464, 465-466 (Miss. 1921).  
  17. See MISS. CODE § 29-3-1, re local school board control of trust lands; see 
also, e.g., Jones v. Madison Cty., 18 So. 87, 91 (Miss. 1895) (legal title vested in State of 
Mississippi); Street v. City of Columbus, 23 So. 773, 774 (Miss. 1898) (same); 
Robertson v. Monroe Cty., 79 So. 184, 185 (Miss. 1918) (“the State is therefore a 
trustee”); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sunflower Cty., 87 So. 417 (Miss. 1921) (same); 
Armstrong v. Jones, 170 So. 637, 640 (Miss. 1936); Bridgforth v. Middleton, 186 So. 
837, 838 (Miss. 1939); Pilgrim v. Neshoba Cty., 40 So. 2d 598 (Miss. 1949) (lands here 
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been the beneficiaries of the school lands trust but have never been its fee 
simple title owners.  This system and its title relationships remain, though 
knowledgeable citizens recognize that far greater financial resources are 
needed if we are to have only adequate public schools, Prekindergarten 
(PK) through Twelfth (12th) grade. 
 In the course of postbellum Reconstruction, another new 
constitution—Mississippi’s third—made extensive provisions for “a 
uniform system of public schools.”18  With assorted twists and turns 
because of perceived white supremacy and related racial considerations, 
and—to a lesser extent—of religious considerations, there is a sense in 
which this postbellum system of freely accessible pre-college public 
schools exists to this day. 
 In the early days of statehood, the school year lasted only four 
months.19  The reasons for this practice ranged from—on the one hand, the 
expense of operating public schools for longer periods of time each year 
to—on the other hand, the fact that the rural lifestyle of most Mississippians 
made it necessary that older school-age children be available for farm labor, 
both at planting in the spring of each year and at harvest in the fall.20  In 
1912, communities with a population of at least 5000 people became 
eligible to extend their school years to seven months.21  The minimum 
public school year today is one hundred eighty (180) days in which the 
school personnel and students must be in attendance for not less than sixty-
three percent (63%) of the instructional day.22    
 Sadly, once Reconstruction had passed in the late 1870s, racial 
 
involved conveyed in trust to the State of Mississippi); Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 
5-6 (Miss. 1989); Morrow v. Vinson, 666 So. 2d 802, 805 (Miss. 1995); Miss. Gaming 
Comm’n v. Bd. of Educ., of Harrison Cty., 691 So. 2d 452, 461 (Miss. 1997); Clark v. 
Stephen D. Lee Foundation, 887 So. 2d 798, 803 (¶15) (Miss. 2004); see also, Simmons 
v. Holmes, 49 Miss. 134, 144-45, 1873 WL 4145 (1873).  
  18. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1869); see Chrisman v. Mayor of Town of 
Brookhaven, 12 So. 458, 459-60 (Miss. 1893). 
  19. “At least one school must be maintained in each school district for four 
months in the year.” Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758, 763, 1879 WL 4019 (1879); Bufkin 
v. Mitchell, 63 So. 458, 460, 461 (Miss. 1913); Miller v. State ex rel. Russell, 94 So. 706, 
708-09 (Miss. 1923); and Tunica Cty. v. Town of Tunica, 227 So. 3d 1007, 1024, 1034 
(¶¶ 39, 72) (Miss. 2017). 
  20. Under the 1890 constitution as originally enacted, “agricultural 
improvement” was one of the original goals of the free public schools. See, e.g., Morris 
v. Vandiver, 145 So. 228, 229, 230-32 (Miss. 1933) (agricultural high school); State 
Teachers’ College v. Morris, 144 So. 374, 376 (Miss. 1932); Bufkin v. Mitchell, 63 So. 
458, 460, 462 (Miss. 1913). 
  21. Miss. Laws ch. 255 (1912); see Bufkin v. Mitchell, 63 So. 458, 459 (Miss. 
1913). 
  22. MISS. CODE §§ 37-13-63, -151-5(j). 
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segregation in public schools became a cruel fact of life in Mississippi,23 
and in the American South in general.  In 1960, and with white state leaders 
fearful and determined to resist the probable effects of Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954, 1955),24 the mandatory public school attendance 
component of Section 201 was deleted from the state constitution.25  This, 
of course, was at a time when, as a practical matter, not many African 
American citizens were able to register and vote.  It was not until 1987 that 
the constitutional mandate for compulsory26 free public schools was 
restored.27  
 In the aftermath of Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Education 
(1969),28 the legislature quickly passed a statute outlawing racial 
segregation in “any group, area, school, institution or other politic 
subdivision of the State.”29  Little prescience was required to sense the 
purpose and meaning of the next sentence of that new statute, viz., “There 
shall be no governmentally enforced segregation by race, color or national 
origin and there shall be no governmentally enforced integration by reason 
of race, color or national origin.”30  Section 37-15-35 is still on the books, 
though the latter clause is arguably a dead letter.  
Of more practical consequence, and much more so than in the wake 
of the Brown decisions, this state’s public schools became complemented 
by ever-growing and increasing iterations of private, parochial, and more 
 
  23. See MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 207, repealed December 1978; Miss Laws, 
ch. 587 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 557); see also references in Chrisman v. 
Town of Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477, 12 So. 458, 459-60 (1893) and Wyatt v. Harrison-
Stone-Jackson Agric. High Sch., 177 Miss. 13, 170 So. 526, 528 (1936). 
  24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). Alexander had followed Green v. Cty. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 
U.S. 430 (1968).  
  25. See Miss. Laws, ch. 547 (1960), formally inserted into the state 
constitution on Nov. 23, 1960. 
  26. Many state laws advisedly use the phrase “compulsory-school-age child.” 
See, e.g., MISS. CODE, §§ 37-13-91(2) (f); -(3), -(4), -(5), -(6), -(7); Lauderdale Cty. Sch. 
Bd. v. Brown, 106 So.3d 807, 810, 811 (¶¶ 11, 12, 18) (Miss. 2013); L. W. v. McComb 
Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1142 (¶ 25) (Miss. 1999); In Interest of T. H., 
III, 681 So. 2d 110, 116 (Miss. 1996); In Interest of R. G., 632 So. 2d 953, 955 (Miss. 
1994).    
  27. See Miss. Laws, ch. 671 (1987) (House Concurrent Resolution No. 9), 
formally inserted into the state constitution on Dec. 4, 1987. 
  28. Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). Prof. Dennis 
J. Mitchell has told a more complete version of the Alexander saga in A New History of 
Mississippi 469-470 (2014). 
  29. Miss. Laws, ch. 374 (1970), codified as MISS. CODE §37-15-35 (first 
sentence). 
  30. Miss. Laws, ch. 374 (1970), codified as MISS. CODE §37-15-35 (second 
sentence). 
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recently other public Prekindergarten (PK) through Twelfth (12th) grade 
levels of educational alternatives.  The total enrollment for PK-12th grade 
in Mississippi is 442,627.31  While approximately 51,000 Mississippi 
children attend private schools of one variety or another32, and 25,376 
children are homeschooling.33  Relatively few African American students 
have ever attended these sectarian non-public schools.  Consistent with the 
racial makeups of their communities, PK-12 schooling—in its various 
conglomerated iterations in the state today—has become almost as 
segregated de facto as it was de jure in the days before Brown and its 
Alexander mandate.  
Charter schools are an alternative of recent interest.34  No doubt 
some public charter schools have improved the educational experience of 
some school children.  Ostensibly intended to help underprivileged and 
special needs children, however, it is doubtful one could find—in 
Mississippi or much of anywhere else—a student moving to a charter 
school that has a larger minority population than the conventional public 
school that child would otherwise attend.  The number of students attending 
charter schools and their percentage among school age children in the state 
remain relatively minuscule.35  Chronic lack of financial and quality human 
resources has kept many Mississippi public schools mired in mediocrity.   
 The story of the Ayers case is important in the history of education 
here.  Regarding traditional racial practices in public college and university 
classrooms, the 1992 Ayers ruling by the U. S. Supreme Court demanded 
that the State dismantle the sources of such long practiced racial 
segregation.36  With this constitutional precedent in place, the question has 
become, whether—in the half century since Alexander—the sources of 
racially discriminatory practices in PK-12 public schools have been 
 
  31. State Data Report, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (March 9, 
2021 8:55 AM), https://newreports.mdek12.org. 
  32. Top Mississippi Private Schools, PRIVATE SCHOOL REVIEW (March 9, 2021 
9:00 AM), https://www.privateschoolreview.com/mississippi#:~:text=For%20the%2020 
21%20school%20year(view%20national%20tuition%20averages). 
  33.  Brett Kittredge, Number of Homeschoolers in Mississippi Rises, 
MISSISSIPPI CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY (March 9, 2021 9:10 AM), https://mspolicy.org/ 
number-of-homeschoolers-in-mississippirises/#:~:text=According%20to%20unofficial 
%20data%20collected,is%20homeschooled%20by%20September%2015. 
  34. See Mississippi Charter Schools Act.  MISS. CODE, §§ 37-28-1 thru 37-28-
61; see also, MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(v).  
  35. For the year 2019-20, some 2189 students were enrolled in Mississippi 
charter schools, some .0046% of all school age children in the state with a substantial 
mathematical increase over years past. 
  36. United States v. Ayers, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) and Ayers v. Thompson, 358 
F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) (finally and practicably dismantling the sources of substantial 
racial discrimination in all of the State’s institutions of higher learning).  
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dismantled.  After all, in Ayers the State, with discerning and sensible 
leadership, finally accepted the inevitable—and settled.  
Fast forward a generation.  A prime exemplar of the sort of state’s 
data dilemma in the immediate future is whether other than traditional 
educational stratagems—primarily private schools and homeschooling37— 
will become an increasingly effective means38 by which the state continues 
falling short of achieving, in reality, Alexander’s long term, full integration 
mandate.  This becomes a serious question of state constitutional law, given 
the command of the second clause of Article III, § 7, viz., “nor shall any 
law be passed in derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of 
this State to the government of the United States.”39  
Mississippi’s “duty of paramount allegiance” extends to all issues 
and contexts where “the citizens of this State” are subject to and bound by 
the federal Supremacy Clause.40  Suffice it to say that the jury is still out on 
whether—again only for an increasingly prominent exemplar—the Charter 
School Act41 may in time become a release valve that allows the state to 
evade its duties under Alexander.  Its lessons thought learned and accepted 
under Ayers, applied in the state’s free public schools.  Put otherwise, 
because the point is so essential, every school law that the state may enact 
is subject to mandatory scrutiny for whether it has or preserves “substantial 
discriminatory effects.”42  The question going forward is whether 
Mississippi’s leadership will insist that—when it comes to the historic 
constitutional goal of an educated and enlightened citizenry—the state will 
once again try, as the saying goes, “to cut off its nose to spite its face.”  Or 
will it look back to and take heart from that “[not so] brief [1982-1997] 
shining [fairly brightly] moment[s]” that [were] known initially as “the 
 
  37. A not insignificant number of Mississippi parents have a go at home 
schooling their children. See MISS. CODE § 37-13-91(3)(c), see also, Mississippi Home 
School Guidelines, 7 Miss. Admin. Code Pt., R. 30.7.  Contact Mississippi Home 
Educators Assn., www.mhea.net. 
  38. In 2017, approximately 8.1% of all school age children were being 
siphoned off into private schools, and this percentage is reasonably expected to increase 
gradually for the foreseeable future. 
  39. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 7; see the author’s “Of the Paramount Allegiance 
of the Citizens of this State,” CABA Newsletter/Articles, Posted May 2013; 
http://caba.ms/articles/features/paramount-allegiance.html.  
  40. U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  
  41. A voucher school program is at times cussed and discussed, and, if ever 
enacted on any substantial level, may present a significant federal or state constitutional 
test.  
  42. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 7. See discussions herein of the Alexander and 
Ayres cases. 
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Education Reform Act of 1982,”43 to the end of a public order of human 
dignity for one and all.  
 
III. FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
 At the advent of the third decade of the Twenty-first Century, 
Mississippi has found itself living under a constitutional mandate that 
 
The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the 
establishment, maintenance and support of free public 
schools44 upon such conditions and limitations as the 
Legislature may prescribe.45 
 
Section 201 says the legislature shall make three provisions regarding the 
State’s “free public schools.”  The legislature shall establish free public 
schools.  Then it shall maintain these free public schools. Finally, the 
legislature shall support these free public schools.  As fate, fear and the 
constitutional draftsmen would have it, the teeth have largely been pulled 
from these Section 201 mandates by the closing and facially discretionary 
may clause.  
The legislature has been told it may modify its three-step mandate 
with “conditions” and “limitations” thereon, “as the legislature may 
prescribe.”  The core reality here is that—textually and linguistically—
Section 201 falls short of creating self-executing state responsibilities and 
student rights on a firm mandate.  Given this, Mississippi’s constitutional 
jurisprudence—even without discretionary implementation—stops short of 
 
  43. See also the restoration of authority to compel school attendance, Miss. 
Laws, ch. 671 (1987) (House Concurrent Resolution No. 9), formally inserted into the 
state constitution on Dec. 4, 1987, the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law, 
MISS. CODE, § 37-13-91, and, as well, the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate 
Education Program Act of 1997, MISS. CODE, ch. 151. See the provisions for a director 
of the Office of Compulsory School Attendance and the duties thereof, MISS. CODE, § 
37-13-83. 
  44. In State Teachers College v. Morris, 144 So. 374 (Miss. 1932), Chief 
Justice Sydney M. Smith, for the majority, and Justice George H. Ethridge in dissent, 
engage in a useful debate regarding the meaning of “free public school.” This article 
proceeds on the premise that Chief Justice Smith’s opinion is controlling. See also 
Justice Ann Lamar’s controlling opinion in Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So.3d 
598, 605 (¶15) (Miss. 2012) vs. Chief Justice William L. Waller, Jr., 91 So.3d at 608 
(¶26), in dissent; and Justice John B. Holden’s controlling opinion in Miller v. State ex 
rel. Russell, 94 So. 706, 708-709 (Miss. 1923), and Chief Justice Smith’s opinion in 
dissent, 90 So. at 713.   
  45. MISS. CONST, art. VIII, § 201 (1890, as amended; see Miss. Laws, 1987, 
ch. 671, effective Dec. 4, 1987) (italics provided). 
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finding the goal of Section 201 more translatable into practical reality.46  
And so the question has become whether—and to what extent and with 
what effects—the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate Education 
Program Act of 1997, and as amended [MAEP],47 implements Section 201 
and does the work that, standing alone, Section 201 cannot do.                
 The 1970s saw a noble effort toward augmenting—constitutionally 
and practicably—one means of approaching adequate funding for 
Mississippi’s public schools.  By 1980, that effort had led to the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi’s exposition in Fondren v. State Tax Commission,48 
after extensive litigation financed and otherwise supported privately by a 
broad cross-section of public school patrons.49  The Fondren court held that 
the then-current text of Miss. Const. Art. IV, § 112 [in those days, a sort of 
state taxation equal protection clause], coupled with enforcing ad valorem 
tax statutes already on the books, required that all property be carried by 
the assessor in each county at its full and true fair market value.  Prior to 
1980, most real properties and improvements were carried on local tax rolls 
at small and erratically varying fractions of their true value.  All that was 
needed to be done post-Fondren—to maintain local property tax bills at a 
politically tolerable level—was for the respective county supervisors to 
make a mathematically appropriate reduction in the millage rate.  Common 
political sense left little doubt but that, in any county where the supervisors 
did not make the appropriate millage rate reduction, the next elections 
would result in new holders of the offices of the erring supervisors. 
 But it wasn’t long before the legislative powers that be stepped in 
and—quite effectively—used (or was it “responded to”) scare tactics to get 
the voters to gut Fondren at its core, albeit this took a constitutional 
amendment to complete the mischief.  This amendment enshrined 
unreasonably low assessment ratios in the formula for establishing the true 
fair market value of assessable properties and was approved in 1986.50  
 
  46. Regarding the practice of making constitutional clauses self-executing, see, 
e.g., Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988). 
  47. MISS. CODE, ch. 151. The MAEP Act of 1997 effectively eviscerated an 
earlier Attorney General Opinion, Thompson No. 58 (January 29, 1991). MISS. CODE § 
37-151-6, which became law in 2007, put the nail in the coffin.    
  48. Fondren v. State Tax Comm’n, 387 So.2d 712 (Miss. 1980). 
  49. Quite a combination of state business, labor and education leaders had 
hired counsel who brought and prosecuted this suit. See Fondren, 387 So. 2d at 713, for 
the names of counsel in the case. 
  50. See 1986 amendment to MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 112, House Concurrent 
Resolution No. 41, Miss. Laws, 1986, ch. 522, submitted to the electorate and ratified on 
June 3, 1986; see Proclamation of Secretary of State, June 19, 1986. See also, John 
Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution 85-87 (2d ed. 2014). Burrell v. Mississippi 
State Tax Comm’n, discussed on Prof. Winkle’s page 86, was overruled in 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. Morgan, 110 So. 3d 752, 762-63 (¶27) (Miss. 2013). 
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From a political perspective, these assessment ratios only proved what 
anyone with elementary skills in arithmetic could see.  Reducing the 
millage rates would have done the trick, and from the next board of 
supervisors meeting after Fondren was finally decided.  All interest groups 
would have been winners, particularly the once and future compulsory 
attendance school-age children.  
 One fly in the ointment remained, viz., the established political 
preference and practice that commercial and industrial property owners pay 
taxes at a higher rate than the owners of real properties classed as 
agricultural and residential, the latter of whom also had homestead 
exemption deductions.  With the 1986 amendments, a golden opportunity 
to make provision for badly needed additional funding for public schools 
was lost.  And so the state has remained, for some thirty-plus years after the 
fact, the people having forgotten that core lesson of citizenship—taxes are 
the price we pay for civilization, a price sensible and responsible citizens 
tend to believe is well worth paying.  
 
IV. MAEP OF LATE 
 
 In 1997, under the authority of constitutional § 201, the legislature 
established the Mississippi Adequate Education Program (MAEP).51   
Exercising its constitutional discretion, the legislature has defined an 
“adequate education program” as one with:  
 
funding levels necessary for the programs of such school 
district to meet at least a successful Level III [“C”] rating of 
the accreditation system as established by the State Board of 
Education using current statistically relevant state 
assessment data.52 
 
Simply put, MAEP at its core says to each public school district, “If you 
establish and maintain a school district that is successful when measured by 
the standards of the State Accreditation System, then the State will provide 
sufficient funds for your students to succeed.”53  Of course, there is a 
chicken-and-the-egg dimension here.  Still, on March 24, 2006, the 
legislature, including the governor—in solemn and constitutionally 
 
  51. See MISS. CODE § 37-151-6, authority for which lies in MISS. CONST., art. 
VIII, § 201. 
  52. MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a). 
  53. By law, each local school district is required annually to supply twenty-
seven per cent (27%) of basic adequate education program cost for its schools. Miss. 
Code § 37-151-7(2)(a). 
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authorized process—made a great leap forward,54 viz., “Effective with the 
fiscal year 2007, the Legislature shall fully fund the Mississippi Adequate 
Education Program.”55  No discretionary “may” qualifier afforded the State 
room to wiggle out from under this public promise.  On the contrary, the 
State holds a judicial sledgehammer with which to make the locals divvy 
up their twenty-seven percent share. 
 As noted, and as time and fate would have it, alternative, largely 
non-public educational opportunities have emerged. In point of fact, public 
support for MAEP has declined.  October of 2017 provided a watershed 
moment. The mandate of § 37-151-6 notwithstanding, the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi declined the plea of twenty-one school districts that this 
short, one sentence political promise be enforced as it has been so simply 
written,56 so that in demonstrable fact the MAEP would be fully funded to 
at least a “C” level quality.57  With less jurisprudential perception and spine 
than were needed at the moment, the Clarksdale MSD case’s majority of 
justices held that the funding level for MAEP was discretionary “[b]ecause 
Section 37-151-6 does not obligate the Governor to sign a bill fully funding 
MAEP.”58  A few years earlier, another valiant effort to add more teeth to 
§ 201 via a constitutional initiative had failed legally and politically.59   
 
V. STATE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION60 
 
  A State Board of Education (SBE) has been created and given a few 
general charges. The board must “formulate policies according to law for 
implementation by the State Department of Education (SDE).”61 The 
constitution directs the state board that it “shall manage and invest school 
 
  54. But see the problematic ruling in Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of 
Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299 (Miss. 2017), the flaws in which are explained hereinbelow. 
  55. MISS. CODE § 37-151-6. Again, this is without derogation of each local 
school district’s mandate to supply annually twenty-seven per cent (27%) of basic 
adequate education program cost for that district. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(2)(a). 
  56. The legislature has enjoined that, in all exercises of statutory construction 
and application, “All words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to 
their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning; but technical words and phrases 
according to their technical meaning.” MISS. CODE § 1-3-65. There are no technical 
words in Section 37-151-6. 
  57. Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299 (Miss. 
2017). 
  58. Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299, 305, 
306, 307 (¶¶18-31) (Miss. 2017); see also, Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of 
Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988). 
  59. Legislature of Mississippi v. Shipman, 170 So.3d 1211 (Miss. 2015). 
  60. See MISS. CONST., art. VIII, §§ 202, 203. 
  61. Id. 
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funds according to law.”62  Other than these, the constitution says only that 
the board shall “perform such other duties as prescribed by law.”63 
“[A]ccording to law” twice set out, and “as prescribed by law”64 in the more 
general constitutional authorization, refer to such laws as have been enacted 
by the legislature with at least the acquiescence of the governor.65  In due 
course, the legislature has prescribed a variety of duties for the board.66  
A State Superintendent of Education is charged to direct “a central 
management capacity” within the SDE; of course, at the end of the day, the 
“law”67 here referred to is included within the governor’s constitutional 
command that he or she “shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.”68  
Past these, both “law” and “funds” within § 203 also include those received 
from federal, state, charitable, and other sources.  “Law” includes the 
judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction—state and federal---and the 
constitution, common law, and other principles upon which those 
judgments rest.  Religion and LGBTQ are among the several dimensions of 
our collective active existence and recent history that afford contexts for 
problematic educational administrative activity. 
 The nine state board members serve staggered nine-year terms.69 
They receive their appointments from three sources.  Five seats on the state 
board are filled by the governor, though not all simultaneously.  At least 
one such gubernatorial appointee must come from each of the three state 
supreme court districts—northern, central, and southern.70  
 One gubernatorial appointee must be actively engaged full-time as 
a school administrator, and another must be a full-time schoolteacher.  
Presumably, these occupational appointees must hold positions with public 
schools in Mississippi.  As well, “full-time basis” excludes county or 
district school board members with other employments, though nothing is 
said whether a person other than a county or district superintendent may 
have this post.  The lieutenant governor makes two at-large appointments 
to the SBE. The speaker of the house of representatives also makes two at-
large appointments.71  Terms are staggered so that there can be no time 
 
  62. Id. 
  63. Id. 
  64. Id. 
  65. MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 72 
  66. MISS. CODE § 37-1-3. 
  67. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 203(2). 
  68. MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123. 
  69. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 203(2); MISS. CODE § 37-1-1. 
  70. These districts are subject to reconfiguration following the 2020 Census, if 
that is necessary to make their populations approximately the same.    
  71. The criteria for appointment to the State Board are found in MISS. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 203(2). 
2021] EDUCATING MISSISSIPPI 173 
when more than four state board members owe their appointments to the 
same governor. 
 Then there is the meat in the coconut. “The State Board of Education 
shall adopt and maintain a curriculum and course of study to be used in the 
public school districts that is designed to prepare the state’s children and 
youth to be productive, informed, creative citizens, workers, and leaders . . 
. .”72 This awkwardly worded curriculum aspiration—not likely to get high 
marks from a competent English grammar teacher—may be understood as 
turning out productive citizens, productive workers, and productive leaders, 
informed citizens, informed workers and informed leaders, and creative 
citizens, creative workers, and creative leaders.  
 
VI. FUNDING MAEP 
 
 We have seen that—as an outgrowth of the fifteen-year [1982-97] 
“shining moment”—the political partnership that consists of the house of 
representatives, the senate, and the governor has exercised its constitutional 
authority and prescribed a formula for computing the state’s annual 
allocation of funds for operating the MAEP.73  This funding formula has 
been designed to assure that every student is afforded an opportunity for at 
least a “Successful” [“C”] level education regardless of where s/he lives.74  
The State Board has recognized that to meet this goal, the system must: (a) 
provide equity by recognizing differences in local resources, and (b) 
provide a level of resources necessary that adequate educational 
opportunities will be available for each school-age child.   
 The MAEP statutory funding formula is of some complexity, and 
some of its minutiae are beyond the scope of this elaboration.75 Summarily, 
funding for each district is a function of average daily attendance and basic 
student cost.  The cost of educating each such student76 multiplied by 
average daily student attendance.77  As noted, twenty-seven percent (27%) 
of this annual allocation comes from the local school district level.  Then 
there are add-ons, inflation factors, trust funds, and other complications laid 
out in the roughly eleven pages of statutory text that make up § 37-151-7.78   
 
  72. MISS. CODE § 37-1-3(2)(a). 
  73. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7. 
  74. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7. 
  75. A Class I (“A+” grade) math student is likely needed here. 
  76. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(1)(b). 
  77. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(1)(a). 
  78. Recognizing that many in need of understanding matters such as those 
presented in this chapter were not math majors in college, the Mississippi State 
Department of Education, Office of School Financial Services, has published and made 
readily accessible power point presentations, viz., “MISSISSIPPI ADEQUATE 
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VII. THE UNFORTUNATE CLARKSDALE MSD DECISION 
 
 On careful study and reflection, it appears that Clarksdale MSD may 
have been incorrectly decided.  Any such suggestion is swimming upstream 
against the same forces as was Fondren, noted above, and in the noble effort 
that led to Shipman, sadly put to rest in 2015.  Recent history suggests the 
same political resistance forces remain “out there,” probably stronger and 
more self-centered than in the days following Fondren and, as well, in the 
State’s failure to follow through with its solemn and unequivocal political 
promise made in 2007 for fully funding MAEP79 and, more recently, by 
rejecting Shipman and its accompanying constitutional initiative.   
 Foremost, a significant percentage of white public school patrons 
want their children to attend largely white schools.  These good people do 
not believe they have the financial means at once to (a) pay private school 
tuition, etc., (b) pay taxes sufficient to support public schools at the MAEP 
level, and (c) maintain their preferred lifestyle.  Moreover, most parents of 
school age children—and with a viable alternative—do not find “C” quality 
public schools acceptable.  Still, the imperatives of state educational history 
make it important that the jurisprudential problems with the Clarksdale 
MSD decision be set out, explained and understood.  These problems 
include flaws in statutory analysis, in constitutional analysis, and in general 
adjudicative jurisprudence.  Also important is understanding the familiar 
jurisprudential premise that a matter80 should be decided on non-
constitutional grounds, where that is practicable.81  To some, this premise 
 
EDUCATION PROGRAM (MAEP), An Overview Of How The Formula Is Calculated,” 
and “MISSISSIPPI ADEQUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM (MAEP), An Overview Of 
How The Base Student Cost (BSC) Is Calculated.” 
  79. See MISS. CODE § 37-151-6 and its mandate for fully funding MAEP, 
coupled with the governor’s oath and obligation that he or she “shall see that the laws are 
faithfully executed.” MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123. The controlling opinion in Clarksdale 
MSD is too timid when it comes to the governor’s mandatory duty. See Clarksdale MSD, 
233 So. 3d at 305 (¶22). After all, the court must presume that the governor will 
discharge his constitutional duty under Art. V., § 123. See Trotter v. Frank P. Gates & 
Co., 139 So. 843, 845 (Miss. 1932). Indeed, all state officers are presumed to perform 
their official duties, absent clear evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., State ex rel. Moore v. 
Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 643 (Miss. 1991); Harris v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 
366 So. 2d 651, 655-656 (Miss. 1979); Raper v. State, 317 So. 2d 709, 712 (Miss. 1975) 
(presumption applies “to all Federal, state, county and municipal officers of high or low 
rank”); Slay v. Lowery, 119 So. 819, 820 (Miss. 1928). 
  80. As well, keep in mind that “matter” is the common (if not exclusive) 
constitutional word of choice for labeling that which is the object of the adjudicative 
process.  See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 146, 156, 159, 161. 
  81. See, e.g., In Matter of Adoption of D.D.H., 268 So.3d 449, 456-457 (¶¶ 31-
33) (Miss. 2018) (duty to deny a request to decide a constitutional question that is 
unnecessary to the resolution of the litigation); Johnson v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 732 
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has been of biblical proportions,82 though at times it merely confuses the 
familiar with the necessary83 
 To begin with and perhaps foremost, Clarksdale MSD is about the 
legislative facts84 and circumstances relating to—and the meaning of, and 
application and enforcement of—a statute. That statute has been 
denominated Miss. Code. § 37-151-6.  More narrowly, the controlling 
opinion says that, to decide the case, “this Court must first look at the 
language of the statute at issue.”85  Fine,86 as § 37-151-6 on its face, and in 
its form and substance as well, is sufficient unto the day.  No one suggests 
there has ever been anything unconstitutional about § 37-151-6.  
 The text of the statute is set out in the next paragraph of the 
Clarksdale MSD opinion.87  With little doubt, good English grammar 
teachers will tell you that the simple wording and phrasing found in § 37-
151-6 means that each year, beginning with the fiscal/school year 2007, the 
State should have fully funded MAEP, and, implicitly, continued to do 
likewise in each succeeding year unless—and until—the statute is 
substantially amended.  
 What really is—in the words of the Clarksdale MSD Court—
“particularly illuminating”88 is that the governor signed the version of § 37-
151-689 that the court was charged with construing, applying and ordering 
 
So. 2d 864, 866 (¶ 9) (Miss. 1998) (same); Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. MP&L, 593 So. 
2d 997, 1003 (Miss. 1991) (same); Hendricks v. State, 79 Miss. 368 (Miss. 1901) 
(“courts should never decide constitutional questions except when necessary to the 
disposition of a cause).  
  82. See Miss. Power Co. v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 168 So. 3d 905, 910 
(¶7) (Miss. 2015); Broadhead v. Monaghan, 117 So. 2d 881, 888 (Miss. 1960).  For an 
impressive statement of this premise, see Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Jean v. 
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 848, 854 (1985). 
  83. It would be helpful to have a copy of the Clarksdale MSD opinion in hand 
while reviewing and considering the above analysis. 
  84. The term “legislative facts” is used in the sense found in the Advisory 
Committee Note to Miss. R. Evid. 201, and in cases such as Samuels v. Mladineo, 608 
So. 2d 1170, 1183-1186 (Miss. 1992); and McPhail v. State, 180 So. 387, 388-389 (Miss. 
1938). 
  85. Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 299, 305 (¶20). 
  86. Of course, the notion of seeking “legislative intent”—the actual thoughts in 
the minds of legislators—is impracticable and approaching nonsense. The question 
always involves assessing what the collective legislature said and what the governor did 
not veto, not what one, or more, or even the majority of the collective legislature of two 
separate houses actually and in fact—and at that moment in legislative time---intended, 
nor what the governor had in mind when he engaged in the legislative act of signing the 
bill, or at least the omission of not vetoing the bill. 
  87. Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 305 (¶21).  
  88. See text in Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 305 (¶21).  
  89. See Miss. Laws 2006, ch. 473, § 2, eff. from and after passage (approved 
March 24, 2006).  
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enforced, with the text that the court correctly assumed was controlling. 
Unless amended, that statutory text controls as written—[and should have 
been held to control in Clarksdale MSD]—all future actions otherwise 
subject to § 37-151-6.  The most that can be said of the governor’s role is 
that, any thought of a veto vel non has been and remains legally premature.90  
The court never—with judicial propriety—reaches the proposition set out 
in Clarksdale MSD’s ¶22 until there has been—in actual political fact—a 
veto of a MAEP fiscal year funding bill.  Nothing in Clarksdale MSD 
suggests there ever has been any such veto. 
 As a matter of elementary legal reasoning and understanding, any 
thought of the governor’s signature vel non in Clarksdale MSD—as that 
matter stood on October 19, 2017, the day of decision—is a non-justiciable 
issue.  That matter fails the “ripeness” requisite for justiciability. In 
terminology more familiar to some, there is no case or controversy.  Under 
state law, no one could satisfy the ground rules for a declaratory judgment 
action91 as to whether the governor would—or would not—sign or veto a 
particular MAEP fiscal year funding bill.  
 The conclusory ¶22 in Clarksdale MSD fails for the reasons noted 
above, particularly given that the governor timely otherwise properly 
signed the bill which begins “Effective with the fiscal year 2007, the 
Legislature shall . . . .”  No subsequent legal text ameliorates this mandatory 
“shall”.92  One might safely “bet the farm” that every competent English 
grammar teacher in a Mississippi public school would give the Supreme 
Court an “A,” if it so construed and applied this mandatory “shall.”  No 
constitutional premise precludes the state from obligating itself as it has 
done in §37-151-6.  This statutory text has enough specificity and simplicity 
that—as written and enacted, including being timely signed by the 
governor—it should have carried the day.  
 The state has no honorable way around the fact that it has a public 
and politically moral obligation—and on reasonable, practicable, and 
fiscally responsible terms—of making up the funds not provided over the 
years since 2007 when the §37-151-6 promise was first broken, albeit, to 
be sure, many students who were entitled to the benefits of those funds have 
 
  90. The reference here is to ripeness, that door opening, earliest stage in the 
jurisprudential process of justiciability, and its practice. This premise is explained in § 
1:25 Ripeness, Subject Matter Jurisdiction chapter, in Mississippi Civil Procedure, Vol. 1 
(Jackson, et al., eds. 2019).  
  91. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 57. 
  92. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 287 So. 3d 905, 918 (¶51) (Miss. 2019) (“the 
word “shall” when used in a statute, is mandatory”); In Interest of E.K., a Minor, 249 So. 
3d 377, 383 (¶21) (Miss. 2018) (same); High v. Kuhn, 240 So.3d 1198, 1201 fn. 5 (¶15) 
(Miss. 2017) (same); Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927, 929 (¶5) (Miss. 2006) 
(same); In Interest of D. D. B., A Minor, 816 So. 2d 380, 382 (¶7) (Miss. 2002) (same).   
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completed most---if not all---of their public education in the absence of 
those funds, and others who would have benefited have some—if not all—
of their public school experience remaining ahead of them. 
 
VIII. THE FLAWED END-RUN ATTEMPT BY CLARKSDALE MSD’S 
CONCURRING JUSTICES 
 
 No doubt because they saw the flaws in the majority opinion in 
Clarksdale MSD, Justices Maxwell and Coleman filed concurring opinions, 
arguing another way out, viz., that Article I’s constitutional “separation of 
powers” provisions control. With respect, each was wrong, and remains so.  
Initially, each overlooked the constitutional and practical reality that “there 
is no natural law of separation of powers. Rather, the powers of government 
are separate only insofar as the Constitution makes them separate.”93  
Equally as fundamental, the state clings to a regime of constitutional 
“checks and balances.”94  History teaches that you can’t have it both ways.  
There can be no meaningful “checks and balances” without there also being 
encroachments by officials in one department upon and thwarting the 
ostensible prerogatives of at least one of the other two.  This is why there 
is no absolute separation of powers in state constitutional law, never has 
been, never will be, though some have mistakenly—and no doubt in good 
faith—argued to the contrary.95  
 More directly, the core reason why Justices Maxwell and Coleman 
were mistaken in Clarksdale MSD is simple, viz., all gubernatorial powers 
that could possibly have been brought to bear were and are “legislative” in 
their nature and practical effect, and in the sense contemplated by a 
reasonable reading of Article I.  What these two justices overlooked was 
that the constitution’s “signing sub-clause”96 and “veto sub-clause”97 grant 
the governor powers that are legislative in every real and practical and 
constitutional sense.  
 The idea that the governor’s action in signing or vetoing a bill is a 
legislative act is hardly novel in Mississippi, or anywhere else in the United 
 
  93. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 346 (Miss. 1987) states and 
explains this premise, which has been followed in Myers v. City of McComb, 943 So. 2d 
1, 6 (¶20) (Miss. 2006); see also, Jordan v. Smith, 669 So. 2d 752, 756 (Miss. 1996). 
  94. See, e.g., In Re Fiscal Year 2010 Judicial Branch Appropriations, 27 So. 3d 
394, 395 [1] (Miss. 2010); Myers v. City of McComb, 943 So.2d 1, 7 (¶21) (Miss. 2006); 
Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1002, 1003 (Miss. 1995) 
  95. See Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So. 3d 969, 973-974 (¶¶ 16, 17) (Miss. 2017); 
see also, Alexander v. State By and Through Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1336 (Miss. 1983), 
(“the idealistic concept of absolute separation of powers”). 
  96. MISS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 72, 73. 
  97. MISS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 72, 73. 
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States.  Indeed, one of this state’s great legal scholars, Justice Josiah A. P. 
Campbell, explained the point a long time ago, viz.,  
 
Grant that the governor in signing a bill thereby evidencing 
his approval, does perform a legislative act. It is as a 
governor that he acts legislatively, as prescribed by the 
constitution. 98 
 
Nationally known state constitutional scholar, the late Judge Thomas M. 
Cooley, in his famous treatise, reported that “in the approval of laws, the 
governor is a component part of the legislature.”99  
 It is the nature and function of a governmental power that 
determines its Article I category.  The “signing sub-clause” and “veto sub-
clause” are polar opposites in exercise and effect.  These clauses 
contemplate, authorize and direct the exercise of “legislative powers,” and 
only legislative powers.  Either a signing or a veto is the performance of a 
political power that is legislative in constitutional nature and in its political 
and practical reality.  Because their effects are forward looking—focusing 
on what the law will be going forward—these either/or alternative activities 
are just as much the exercise of legislative powers as are the actions of 
members of the house and senate in passing such a bill in the first place.   
 It is a simple mistake to assume that everything a governor does is 
the exercise of an executive power.  Not so at all.  The key to understanding 
this comes when one has in mind how many public officials in this and no 
doubt other states are constitutionally given—and actively exercise—
differing powers that fall within two—and occasionally even all three—of 
the powers identified and discussed in Article I of the Mississippi 
Constitution.  Most familiar of all are the justices of the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi when they make what we still call common law100 or in some 
instances equitable remedies.101 
 Put another way, a bill such as the one that became § 37-151-6, or 
one that may have failed, was subject the same procedural process.  At its 
core, to become law a bill has to receive a majority vote of one (or more) 
from the house of representatives, from the senate, and from the governor. 
 
  98. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Bd. of Supervisors of Coahoma Cty., 64 
Miss. 358, 364, 1 So. 501, 502-503 (1887) (emphasis added). 
  99. Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss. 802, 809 [••4], 1874 WL 6529 (Miss. 1874), 
quoting Cooley on Constitutional Limitations at 155 (1878). 
100. See, e.g., Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198 (Miss. 2015), which made new 
state law in the field of donative transfers of property. More globally, see “The Coming 
of the Common Law in Mississippi” in my Heroes, Rascals and the Law; Constitutional 
Encounters in Mississippi History 301-370 (2019). 
101. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 460-67 (Miss. 1983). 
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And in a proper and timely sequence.  At each of these three stages, a single 
vote majority sufficed.  In the 122-member house of representatives,102 62 
affirmative votes will carry the day, or fewer if the issue were one where 
by rule the majority of those present and voting would suffice.  Similarly, 
in the 52-member senate, 27 affirmative votes will ordinarily suffice, 
subject to the same caveat.103  In the case of the governor, of course, a 1-0 
vote is all it takes.104 
 Just as the lieutenant governor is given both legislative and 
executive powers,105 so also is the governor given executive and legislative 
powers.  These legislative gubernatorial powers and practices include 
making recommendations to the legislature regarding bills that should be 
passed, amended or rejected.106  And they include acting in accordance with 
the “signing sub-clause” and/or the “veto sub-clause” of the constitution, 
authority for calling special legislative sessions, and no doubt more. 
 For present purposes, one gubernatorial power is front and center. 
It is that found in Article V, labeled “Executive.”  “The Governor shall see 
that the laws are faithfully executed.”107  Nothing in the constitution or any 
other law or known political authority exempts §37-151-6 from the 
category “the laws” with respect to which the governor–on his oath–has the 
job of “faithful . . . execut[ion].”   
 
IX. A PROPER CLARKSDALE MSD ADJUDICATION 
 
 The above points aside, there are two more discrete and independent 
errors or omissions in the Clarksdale MSD opinions. For one, consider the 
justices’ failure to construe and apply and enforce the term “adequate” in 
Mississippi Adequate Education Program.108  With little doubt, a team of 
expert witnesses, well qualified within Miss. R. Evid. 702, could be 
 
102. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at 
pages 119-120 (2017). 
103. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at 
pages 98-99 (2017). 
104. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at 
page 77 (2017). 
105. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1987). 
106. See MISS. CONST., art. V, § 122. 
107. MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123; see Clark v. Bryant, 253 So. 3d 297, 303 (¶32) 
(Miss. 2018) (“The Governor (as head of the executive branch) must faithfully execute 
all laws passed by the Legislature.”)  
108. MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a) defines “Adequate program,” or “adequate 
education program” or “Mississippi Adequate Education Program (MAEP)”.  Obviously, 
this definition — funding level necessary “to meet at least a successful Level III rating” 
according to the SBE’s accreditation system — should be given substantial consideration 
by any such Miss. R. Evid. 702 qualified experts.  
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assembled to establish the proposition of adjudicative (if not also 
legislative) fact109 whether the level of MAEP funding since 2007 has been 
“adequate.”  And the consequential fact whether the quality of education 
afforded Mississippi’s students could fairly be labeled “adequate.”  
To be sure, the term “adequate” is highly general.  But “adequate” 
is no more general or difficult of construction and application than are 
“reasonable,” “unusual,” “excessive,” “liberty,” “freedom,” “negligent” 
and numerous other terms set forth in the laws that judges and other 
authorized public officials are — every day — expected to construe and 
apply, and in a great variety of settings.  At the least, “adequate” acquires 
flesh from the state’s declared imperative of educating its youths “to 
be(come) productive, informed, creative citizens, workers and leaders.”110  
An outcome determinative adjudication of “adequacy”111 vel non would 
have the added benefit of honoring the practice of deciding matters on non-
constitutional grounds, where that is feasible. 
 Second, there is the equity imperative.  Historically, the most 
important policy statement here is attributed to Horace Mann, father of the 
“Common Schools” movement in the Northeast back in the Nineteenth 
Century.   
 
Education then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is 
a great equalizer of the conditions of men (and women)—
the balance wheel of the social machinery.112 
 
 You start with the legislative facts that Mississippi has long been at 
or near the bottom, among impoverished states in the Union, and has among 
 
109. Justice Virgil Griffith’s findings regarding activities along the “Gold 
Coast” justifying the governor’s decision to order a raid are a familiar example of 
legislative facts found by one of the state’s most respected jurists. State v. McPhail, 180 
So. 387, 388-389 (Miss. 1938); MHSAA v. Hattiesburg High Sch., 178 So. 3d 1208, 
1216 (¶31) (Miss. 2015); Cook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Lowndes Cty., 571 So. 2d 932, 
935 (Miss. 1990); also, Miss. R. Evid., Advisory Committee Note to Rule 201. 
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1-3(2)(a). 
111. The legislature has defined “adequate program” or “adequate education 
program” for purposes of the MAEP Act as the funds needed “for the programs of such 
school district to meet at least a successful Level III (“C”) rating of the accreditation 
system as established by the State Board of Education using current statistically relevant 
state assessment data.” MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a). Presumably, this definition will be 
persuasive, in the absence of a finding otherwise supported by substantial evidence 
which satisfies criteria of Miss. R. Evid. 702.   
112. Horace Mann, 1848, as cited in Education and Social Inequity, (n.d.); also 
www.brainyquote.com/Horace Mann Quotes; see also, Roslin Growe & Paula S. 
Montgomery, “Educational Equity in America: Is Education the Great Equalizer?,” The 
Professional Educator, Vol. XXV, 23 (Spring 2003).  
2021] EDUCATING MISSISSIPPI 181 
its citizens a larger percentage of non-Caucasians than any other state.  As 
well, the state’s citizens have been less able to pay the tax man what he says 
is his due than the people of most any other state.  Add the fact that 
Mississippi has also long been at or near the bottom rung when it comes to 
the level of educational achievement by its citizenry.  
 Legally, one opening question is whether the State’s due process 
clause113 might reasonably be construed to confer an equity or equal 
protection right?  Cannot the same be said of the Open Courts Clause which, 
when you look at the text in historical context, is a contemporary expression 
of Magna Carta.114  Then there is the Unenumerated Rights Clause,115 
which may be the best bet.  Building upon the state’s constitutional 
educational imperative dating back to 1817, followed with the enhanced 
imperative, given the state’s lack of quality of life which with high 
probability may be attributed to poor educational attainments, and the case 
should be there, beyond reasonable dispute, thus rendering non-optional 
“fully fund[ing] the Mississippi Adequate Education Program” to a level 
higher than Level III.  
 Turning to the facts [adjudicative and/or legislative], it doesn’t take 
much knowledge of the demographics of Mississippi to understand that 
there are substantial differences between and among the affected persons 
within the twenty-one school districts that were plaintiffs in Clarksdale 
MSD.  These differences range from the Prentiss County School District in 
Northeast Mississippi, where the minority population was so low that back 
in the 1970s the district was never brought under a federal court 
desegregation order, on the one hand, to the many Delta area districts with 
increasingly heavy minority populations.  Absent from the Clarksdale MSD 
suit were the state’s more affluent school districts, e.g., DeSoto County near 
Memphis, any of the school districts in Jackson County116 with an industrial 
base and near Mobile, Harrison County [Biloxi and Gulfport], Lee County 
[Tupelo], Lafayette County [Oxford and University of Mississippi], 
Oktibbeha County [Starkville and Mississippi State University].  
Hattiesburg School District was a plaintiff, but that district does not include 
the affluent parts of the Forrest/Lamar County area, and the University of 
Southern Mississippi is not on the tax rolls.  
 Then there are great and disparate funding inequities, from county 
to county among Mississippi’s eighty-two, and from school district to 
 
113. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14. 
114. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; see also the last three paragraphs of Justice 
Virgil Griffith’s opinion in State v. McPhail, 180 So. 387, 391 (Miss. 1938). 
115. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32. 
116. See Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598 (Miss. 2012), discussed 
below. 
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school district.117   
 Able counsel with a bevy of qualified and articulate educational 
management professionals should be able to take it from there, so long, that 
is, as the simple promise of Section 37-151-6 remains on the books, an 
aspirational imperative, if nothing else.  A new generation supporting a 
Shipman-like constitutional amendment is bound to come.  The lesson from 
Fondren through the “shining” years from 1982 through 1997, and then the 
Shipman advocates, is nothing less. As in 1817 and 1832, “schools and the 
means of education, shall forever be encouraged in this State.” 
 
X. REVENUES FROM SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS—THE “RAINY DAY” 
FUND AND MORE 
 
 We have seen above how MAEP reflects a deal made in 2007 
between the state and its public school districts.  Each district agreed to 
make all reasonable efforts to turn out students who are able to satisfy the 
MSBE accountability scale of “Successful” [“C”].  The state agreed to 
provide the funds needed to enable and facilitate such educational 
achievements, no matter where within each respective district the students 
live. One big fly in the ointment remains.  The legislature has hardly ever 
fully funded MAEP, its express commitment made in plain English in § 37-
151-6 to the contrary notwithstanding.     
 Over and above MAEP, the Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust 
has continued as a significant source of funding for the public schools.118  
The important variable here has been that the benefits a particular district 
draws from the trust are as variable as the factors that make up the fair 
market value of this tract of real property, or that.  Because land values have 
varied widely, School Land Trust benefits available to the school districts 
have also varied widely.  
 An obligatory return to the proverbial page of history.119  For years, 
and for largely local political reasons, these school trust lands were leased 
for at best nominal rentals.  The 99-year leases for token rentals following 
the Civil War became infamous, an infamy of constitutional proportions.  It 
has now been well settled that rentals or other considerations substantially 
below approximate fair market value are prohibited by the No Donation 
Clause120 of the Constitution.   
 
117. Herein of one of the practical inequity problems produced by Pascagoula 
Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598 (Miss. 2012), discussed below. 
118. See MISS. CODE § 29-3-1, re local control of school lands trust. 
119. See John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 130-133 (2d ed. 
2014). 
120. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 95; see particularly Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 
1, 9-12,  (Miss. 1989); Clark v. Stephen D. Lee Found., 887 So. 2d 798, 803 (¶16) (Miss. 
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 One paragraph on this page of history tells a story that began in the 
late 1980s.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi faced the question 
whether—within the context of Section 211 of the Constitution and 
regarding Sixteenth Section Lands—oil & gas leases that the state had 
granted could extend longer than twenty-five years, though the particular 
well at issue was still producing more than fifty years after discovery, with 
no end in sight. In a rather wooden analysis, the court held such mineral 
leases void after twenty-five years.121  Likely as a result of two strong 
dissenting opinions,122 the people amended Section 211 the very next year, 
providing that “the Legislature may provide, by general law, for leases on 
liquid, solid or gaseous minerals with terms coextensive with the operations 
to produce such minerals.”123  Of course, the primary natural asset of many 
acres of trust lands has been valuable growing timber.  Other such lands 
have been cleared and have fair market rental values according to the crops 
that they may yield, not to mention variables ranging from the dynamics of 
commodities markets to the vagaries of the weatherman.  Few foresaw the 
spring of 2019 floods that ravaged the normally productive Mississippi 
Delta farmlands.  For these and other reasons, the fair market value of 
sixteenth sections and “lieu lands” have varied widely, beginning with that 
core criteria of value—location, location and location. 
 The Chickasaw Cession of 1832 further complicates the story.  
Putting numbers—values and annual income—on the lands that should 
have gone into the School Lands Trust, but didn’t, is even more 
problematic.  The story—told above—of that historic foible centers on the 
litigation led to the U. S. Supreme Court in 1986.124  Establishing the school 
districts of those twenty-three counties in a position of equity with the rest 
of the state may never be fully accomplished.     
 All of this—and much more—is precedent to the benefits enjoyed 
by Mississippi’s public school districts in recent years.  One school district 
may find that it needs a few new school buses. The rainy day fund is there.  
A high school may need to expand its library resources. Or a new football 
stadium or other sports venue.  The Sixteenth Section money in the bank is 
 
2004); Bd. of Educ. of Lamar Cty. v. Hudson, 585 So. 2d 683, 687 (Miss. 1991). A 
driving practical force behind the scenes in Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of 
Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585 (Miss. 1988), was that a decision otherwise would have had the 
effect of approving a more contemporary 99-year lease for an outrageously low rental. 
121. Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1991). See 
discussion in John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution 130-131 (2d ed. 2014). 
122. Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 650-658, 658-666 (Miss. 
1991). 
123. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 211(b) (1890, as amended Nov. 3, 1992); see 
Miss. Laws, 1992, ch. 591 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 552). 
124. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
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there. A third school may need several new teachers at different levels and 
in different fields of study.  Or facilities and equipment for its concert or 
marching band. Chances are that the school lands trust funds are sufficient 
unto the day.125  Building improvements, furniture and equipment, special 
interest programs, support for extra-curricular activities, and dozens of 
other not necessarily recurring financial needs are filled from School Lands 
Trust funds that are readily available. 
    
XI. SUPPLEMENTAL LOCAL ASSESSMENTS 
 
 As explained above, the constitution provides first and foremost that 
funding for public education in Mississippi is handled on a statewide 
basis.126  Recognizing, however, that people residing in some counties or 
separate school districts may place a higher value on public education—
than a merely “adequate education”—above and beyond the political values 
found among the often niggardly legislators in Jackson, the constitution 
makers have given us section 206, which provides, in relevant part, that 
“Any county or separate school district may levy an additional tax, as 
prescribed by general law, to maintain its schools.”127  
 It has been the great good fortune of the Pascagoula School District 
(PSD)128 that an oil refinery and gas terminal have been constructed within 
its boundaries, and that these properties produce substantial ad valorem tax 
revenues.  In 2011, however, the legislature enacted that the revenue from 
such assessable property should be distributed among all public school 
districts in the entire county, not just the district in which such facilities are 
located.  This new law meant that the Ocean Springs School District, the 
Moss Point School District, and Jackson County School District, would 
share these ad valorem revenues, though the physical facilities so assessed 
and taxed lay wholly within the PSD’s political boundaries.  
 In 2012, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the applicable 
words and phrases of Section 206 mean what they simply say.  Every school 
district is empowered to assess and levy an additional tax upon assets 
within that district to “maintain its schools.”  Applying elementary school 
 
125. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1 (2020), viz., “Sixteenth section school 
lands, or lands granted in lieu thereof, constitute property held in trust for the benefit of 
the public schools and must be treated as such.” 
126. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 206, providing for the “state common-school 
fund.” 
127. Id. (emphasis added). While the title of a constitutional section ordinarily 
provides no substantive content, the second phrase in the title of Section 206 may be 
noteworthy, viz., “State common-school fund; additional tax levy by district.”  
128. The district is now known as the Pascagoula-Gautier School District 
(PGSD). 
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linguistics and grammar, the PSD was held entitled—at its discretion—to 
“maintain its schools” by assessing and levying upon the valuable revenue 
producing oil refinery and gas terminal which physically lay entirely within 
the PSD’s geographical and political confines.129  One might safely “bet the 
farm” that every competent English grammar teacher in the Jackson County 
public schools would give the Supreme Court an “A.”      
 
XII. CHARTER SCHOOLS130 
 
 The Mississippi Charter Schools Act131 has been introduced.  
Charter schools are public schools that are a “part of the state’s public 
education system.”132  A charter school may only operate in a school district 
which the State Board of Education has designated as an “A,” “B,” or “C” 
school, these in accordance with the applicable accreditation system, if 
approved by the local district school board.133  For the 2019-2020 school 
year, Mississippi Charter School Authorizer Board (MCSAB) oversaw six 
public charter schools, five in the Jackson area and one in Clarksdale.134 
Another public charter school, Leflore Legacy Academy in Greenwood, 
opened in the fall of 2020, for sixth through ninth grade students only.  
 In “D” and “F” rated public school districts, an applicant may be 
approved with no local board action by the SBE, the agency created to 
approve the establishment of any charter school in the state.135  In “D” or 
“F” districts, a prospective charter school operator must first file an 
application with the SBE. The application process begins in January of each 
year and concludes in the following September, when the SBE makes final 
decisions on the applications.136  The application process is conducted in 
three phases. During the process, the SBE examines and considers many 
criteria, including the applicant’s proposed academic program, discipline 
policies, organizational structure, pupil transportation, food services, and 
must be accompanied by a proposed budget and financial plan.137  If the 
applicant has satisfied all of the criteria and has shown an ability to operate 
 
129. Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598, 599, 602, 604-607 (¶¶ 1, 7, 
14, 15, 19, 22) (Miss. 2012).   
130. Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73 (Miss. 2019) (charter schools funding 
upheld). 
131. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-1, et seq (2016).   
132. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-3(2) (2016). 
133. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7(2)(c) (2016). 
134. Clarksdale Collegiate Charter School received an extensive, quite lengthy 
and largely favorable front page feature review in The (Jackson) Clarion Ledger, Sept. 
19, 2019.  
135. See, generally, MISS. CODE §§ 37-28-7, -9 and -19 (2016). 
136. See www.charterschoolboard.ms.gov/Pages/RFP.aspx.  
137. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-15 (Rev. 2019). 
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a school successfully, the SBE may then approve the application.  On the 
other hand, the SBE may deny an application, though it must set forth the 
reasons for doing so.138  Once an application has been approved, the SBE 
and the applicant then negotiate a charter setting forth the terms and 
conditions of the operation of the school.139  The charter is a contract 
between the SBE and the school, which sets forth terms and conditions for 
the operation of the school for a period of five years, subject to renewal at 
the end of the initial five-year term.140  
 Any student residing within the geographic boundaries of a school 
district in which the charter school is located may attend that school.141  In 
addition, any student may attend the charter school, if he or she resides in a 
school district rated “C,” “D,” or “F,” either at the time the school was 
approved by the Board, or at the time the student enrolls.142  A charter 
school may not limit admission “based on ethnicity, national origin, 
religion, gender, income level, disabling condition, proficiency in the 
English language, or academic or athletic ability.”143 
 The charter may limit students based on certain ages or grade levels 
and may organize based on a specific theme, concept or focus, such as 
students with disabilities, same gender, students with disciplinary problems 
or students at risk of academic failure.144  Also, [t]he underserved students 
of a charter school’s enrollment collectively must reflect that students of all 
ages attending schools in the district in which the school is located, defined 
for the purposes of this chapter as being at least eighty per cent (80%) of 
that population.145  The charter school must enroll all students who wish to 
attend unless the number exceeds the school’s capacity,146 in which event 
the school must select students by lottery.147  Once established, the charter 
school must give enrollment preference to students enrolled in the school 
in the previous year and to siblings of students enrolled.148  A charter school 
may give enrollment preference to students of the applicant, board members 
and employees as long as those students do not make up more than ten per 
cent (10%) of the total student population.149 
 
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-19 (Rev. 2019). 
139. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-21 (Rev. 2019). 
140. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-28-21, -33 (Rev. 2019).  
141. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23 (Rev. 2019). 
142. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-1(b) (Rev. 2019). 
143. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-3 (2013). 
144. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23. 
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-5. 
146. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-6. 
147. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7. 
148. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23(8). 
149. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23(8). 
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 Funding for charter schools follows the student; that is, the charter 
school receives a per student allocation of funds from the district in which 
it resides and the SDE.150  The Supreme Court of Mississippi has upheld 
the legitimacy of this funding mechanism.151  Charter schools may also 
receive certain types of private funding such as grants, gifts and 
donations.152 
 
XIII. VOUCHER SYSTEM 
 
 Government-issued vouchers are an alternative strategy for public 
education which is practiced in a number of states.  One important feature 
of this educational funding format is that the student and/or his or her 
parents have choices as to what schools they wish to attend.  Another 
argument for a voucher system is that it creates competition among schools, 
which arguably results in higher quality educational opportunities being 
available for school age students.  
 In recent years, Mississippi has offered a single and carefully 
tailored voucher school program.  The Nate Rogers Scholarship for 
Students with Disabilities/Mississippi Speech Language Therapy 
Scholarship has been available in K-6 grades for children suffering the 
disability commonly known as dyslexia. There are separate programs for 
children attending public and private schools.153    
 Mississippi has not had enough history with school vouchers that 
credible, experience- based conclusions may be drawn.  A good place to 
start for persons wishing to pursue the subject is the “14 Pros and Cons of 
School Vouchers,” published by Vittana.org.154 
 
XIV. RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELATED ISSUES 
 
 Of course, as long as there are teachers who give examinations, 
there will be prayers said in public schools, or so the saying goes.  Yet there 
have been and remain serious constitutional and other concerns about 
blatantly Christian prayers, invocations, Bible readings, and other religious 
observances that once were commonplace in Mississippi’s public schools, 
e.g., devotionals held over the P. A. system at the beginning of each school 
 
150. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-55 (2016). 
151. Araujo, 283 So.3d at 73. 
152. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-59. 
153. See Mississippi Voucher Programs (March 2017), 
http://ees.force.com/mbdata/mbprofallBSrt?Rep=VMS.  
154. Louise Gaille, 14 Pros and Cons of School Vouchers, VITTANA.ORG 
PERSONAL FINANCE BLOG (Mar. 8, 2021, 10:10 PM), https://vittana.org/14-pros-and-
cons-of-school-vouchers. 
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day, or before the kickoff in high school football games, among other 
occasions. The latter was held impermissible in the year 2000?155  
 The statutory backdrop on the books today dates back to 1997. 
References to religion or “the use of religious literature, history, art, music 
and other things having a religious significance” are permitted, so long as 
they do not “aid any religious sect or sectarian purpose.”156  Public schools 
are instructed to display in all classrooms enlarged posters stating “IN GOD 
WE TRUST,” as this is the “motto of the United States of America.”157 
 Legal principles emanating from the Establishment Clause have 
been brought to bear in Mississippi schoolhouses, along with other federal 
authorities.158  For example, legislation prohibiting the teaching of the 
Darwinian theory of evolution has been held impermissible and 
unenforceable under Establishment Clause.159  Any effort to teach or 
present so-called “creationism” should suffer a similar fate, and for the 
same reasons. Past that, the plot thickens, time to trot out the familiar insight 
that, in the law “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”160  The rise 
of the secular society and the increasing variety of religions and faiths 
beyond mainstream Christianity—and their passionate prejudices and 
practices – have complicated matters since the simple exhortations of the 
state’s first two constitutions. 
 The most prominent matter regarding religion in public schools has 
been Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist.,161 dating back to the mid-
1990s.  A number of students, parents and public interest organizations 
 
155. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); M. B., a minor 
through Bedi v. Rankin Cty. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5023115 (S.D. Miss. 2015). See also, 
Bd. of Trustees of Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Knox, 638 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1994) and 
688 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1997) (student read prayers). 
156. 1997 Miss. Laws Ch. 599, codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §37-13-163(1). 
157. 1970 Miss. Laws Ch. 374, codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §37-15-35. It is 
hard to see how such an iteration survives under the Establishment Clause, or under its 
counterpart in the Mississippi Constitution. See Constitutional Law, Ch. 19, §19:55, 
“Freedom of Religion,” Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law (Third Edition), Vol. 3, April 
2020. 
158. Buford, at * 9-11.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, Superintendent, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971). 
159. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 693, 696-98 (Miss. 1970). A legislative 
effort to bar the teaching of Darwinism succeeded on paper only. See Mitchel, A New 
History of Mississippi 475 (2014). For a contemporary summary of issues surrounding 
Darwinian evolution and so-called “intelligent design” theory, see Yuval Noah Harari, 
Sapiens: A Brief History of Mankind 397-399 (2018). 
160. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) 
161. David Ingebretsen, Et Al. v. Jackson Public School Dist., 88 F.2d 274 (5th 
Cir. 1996), affirming Ingebretsen v. Jackson PSD, 864 F.Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994). 
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brought an action challenging a state statute162 which authorized public 
school students to initiate non-sectarian, non-proselytizing prayers at 
various compulsory and noncompulsory school events.  The U. S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that  
 
The School Prayer Statute fails all three prongs of the Lemon 
test[163] because its purpose is to advance prayer in public 
schools, its effect is to advance religion in the schools and it 
excessively entangles the government with religion.164 
 
 Shortly after Ingebretsen, a north Mississippi federal court 
considered a matter involving a variety of religious practices in the 
Pontotoc County.  In 1996, Herdahl v. Pontotoc County School Dist.165 
adjudged the viability of the school district’s efforts to evade a number of 
U. S. Supreme Court cases relating to religious practices in public schools.  
The fact driven Herdahl opinion considered intercom prayers,166 pre-
official school day activities–a brief voluntary activity was permitted,167 
classroom prayer–“[n]othing herein interferes in any way with each 
student’s right to individually pray at the lunch table in the cafeteria, or to 
individually pray silently at any other time,”168 and Bible class, not 
permitted at all.169  Lemon correctly controlled the court’s constitutional 
analysis.170 
 Circa 2013-2014, religion-related activities in Northwest Rankin 
High School (NWRHS) in central Mississippi gave rise to the decision in 
 
162. 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 609, § 1(2), codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-4 
& 37-13-4.1 (rev. 1990). 
163. The state courts of Mississippi have applied the U. S. Supreme Court 
Lemon construction of the Establishment Clause. See Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1224-25 (¶¶ 28-31) (Miss. 2005); Fountain v. 
State ex rel MSDH, 608 So. 2d 705, 708 (Miss. 1992). 
164. Ingebretsen, 88 F.2d at 279.  As with all important cases cited in this 
chapter, the opinion of the court should be read and studied in its entirety.  This is 
particularly so here, as there was a strong dissent filed on application for rehearing en 
banc, with two Mississippi circuit judges joining the dissent.  See Ingebretsen, 88 F.2d at 
281-88.   
165. Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist., 933 F.Supp. 582 (Miss. 1996); prior 
thereto, see Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
166. Herdahl, 933 F.Supp. at 586-89. 
167. Id. at 589-91. 
168. Id. at 591. 
169. Id. at 591-93. 
170. Id. at 593-98. U. S. District Judge Neal Biggers also cited and relied on Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a pre-Lemon decision. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971). The Ingebretsen case was noted in its U. S. District Court iteration. See 
Herdahl, 933 F.Supp. at 585, 588, 591, 593, 598. 
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M. B., a minor, which produced points of interest.171  On July 17, 2013, the 
school district had adopted a facially neutral and apparently permissible 
Religion in Public Schools Policy.  In April of 2014, the NWRHS held a 
ceremony in the school assembly, honoring students who had scored well 
on the ACT test.  The school invited a pastor to deliver a prayer at this 
school-sponsored event.  Early in the ceremony, the pastor instructed the 
students to bow their heads as he delivered his conventionally Christian 
opening prayer.172  Such ceremonies had been regularly held in the past, 
and “the 2014 event proceeded in its traditional fashion.”173  Relying on the 
Establishment Clause and the Lemon case, the U. S. District Court 
explained 
 
[T]he invocation at the April 17, 2014 ACT Ceremony 
blatantly violated these [previously stated] mandates. The 
preacher-led prayer at this event was an affront to M.B. and 
any of the other student who may not have shared the same 
beliefs espoused by the reverend.  In fact, even those who 
are of the Christian faith (which may have included M.B.) 
could have taken exception. Regardless of the faith shared 
by a fraction or even a majority of its pupils, schools owe a 
duty to all students to refrain from conduct which gives the 
appearance of advocating a particular religion. In fairness to 
and protection of all, they must remain neutral. This same 
duty is owed to parents who submit their children to the 
protection of educators. . . .174 
 
   But the 2014 ACT Ceremony was not all.  In October of 2014, the 
principal of the Northwest Rankin Elementary School “instructed all fifth-
grade teachers to walk their students through a hallway where members of 
a Christian association, Gideons International, were distributing Bibles.”  
All of this was coordinated with the Gideons.  Citing Lemon, the U. S. 
District Court held that “Assisting with the distribution of Bibles to students 
at school, during school hours, is inherently coercive,” and was 
prohibited.175  Though predicated solely on the First Amendment, the 
 
171. There are other procedural twists and turns in this case that are of little or 
no interest. 
172. M.B., a minor, at **5-6. 
173. M.B., a minor, at *6. 
174. M.B., a minor, at *6. 
175. M.B., a minor, at *10.  This federal constitutional ruling calls into serious 
question the final clause of Miss. Const. Art. III, § 18, which provides that the state 
constitution does not “exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school in this 
state.” M.B., a minor, and cases going back to Abingdon v. Schempp, for all practical 
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principles applied and enforced in M. B. are consistent with settled 
constructions and applications of Section 18 of the Mississippi 
Constitution.176 
 Buford v. Coahoma Agricultural High School177 arose in a different 
factual context.  The complaining party was a school principal who had 
been discharged for flagrantly violating the school’s religious neutrality 
policy, viz., the principal led programs involving scriptural readings from 
the Bible.178  Constitutional freedom of religion, conventional variety, was 
upheld. 
 The M.B., a minor and Buford cases are worthy of reflection in light 
of the Mississippi Student Religious Liberties Act, effective July 1, 2013.179  
For one thing, the act has been crafted from the perspective of the student. 
Its tenor is to put any student activity on a par with non-religious activities 
that may be permitted in the school.  The act is likely to be tested in the 
courts, where it seems destined to expose for scrutiny the perennial 
dilemma in the First Amendment, viz., the Free Exercise Clause leaves 
people free to engage in all sorts of activities and practices that the 
Establishment Clause would never permit the state to require or enforce. 
 There may be religion and free exercise-based absences from school 
that should be recognized or honored. The legislature has enacted that 
 
An absence may be excused if the religion to which the 
compulsory-school-age child or the parents adheres, requires 
or suggests the observance of a religious event. The approval 
of the absence is within the discretion of the superintendent 
of the school district, or his designee, but approval should be 
granted unless the religion’s observance is of such a duration 
 
purposes overrule Justice Julian Alexander’s eloquent opinion in Chance v. Mississippi 
State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941), and, 
as well, U. S. Circuit Judge J. P. Coleman’s opinion in Norwood v. Harrison, 340 
F.Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), much of which takes Justice Alexander’s opinion and 
quotes it verbatim, Norwood, 340 F.Supp. at 1008-1009, quoting Chance, 200 So. at 709-
710, 713. See also John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 43-44 (2d ed. 2014) 
and Justice Anderson’s dissent in Chance, 200 So. at 714. 
176. See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18, which, if anything, is stronger than the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. First, “[n]o religious test as a 
qualification for office shall be required.” Second, “no preference shall be given by law 
to any religious sect or mode of worship.” See also, John Winkle, The Mississippi State 
Constitution, 43-44 (2d ed. 2014).  
177. Buford v. Coahoma Agricultural High Sch., 2014 WL 4692753 (N. D. 
Miss. 2014).  
178. Buford, at ** 3-5. 
179. 2013 Miss. Laws ch. 334 (S.B. No. 2633); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-1 
thru -13.  
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as to interfere with the education of the child.180 
 
 School administration, funding and use of textbooks are other 
contexts in which religious freedom issues have arisen and been 
adjudicated.  Miss. Const., art. VIII, § 208, provides that  
 
No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any part 
of the school or other educational funds of this state, nor 
shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any 
sectarian school. . . . 
 
The constitution thus has long forbidden the use of public funds for the 
support and operation of schools that have a religious or sectarian 
affiliation.181        
  
XV. LGBTQ ISSUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
 In recent years, the rights and practices of gay and lesbian students 
have drawn attention in Mississippi.  In 2010, Itawamba Agricultural High 
School in northeast Mississippi faced just such an issue.  The school board 
canceled the senior prom which had been scheduled for early April, rather 
than let down barriers against the lesbian lifestyle.  Constance McMillen, 
an openly lesbian female student since the eighth grade, asked permission 
that she be allowed to wear a tuxedo and bring her girl friend to the prom 
as her date to the senior prom.  School officials balked. Constance sued 
them in federal court.   
 Citing established federal precedents, Judge Glen Davidson treated 
Constance’s lifestyle and her then present proposal as forms of protected 
speech, albeit of the non-verbal variety.  The “expression of one’s identity 
and affiliation to unique social groups may constitute speech as envisioned 
by the First Amendment.”182  The court never mentioned the free speech 
clause of the state constitution. This is of interest because, if anything, the 
state’s free speech clause is stronger and more protective of the individual 
than is the First Amendment.183  The Mississippi Constitution declares that 
“freedom of speech . . . shall be held sacred . . . .”184  Nonetheless, Judge 
Davidson invoked and quoted cases from a variety of other jurisdictions 
 
180. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-13-91(4)(g). 
181. State Teachers’ College v. Morris, 165 Miss. 758, 144 So. 374, 377 (1932); 
See also Winkle, Mississippi State Constitution 129 (2d ed. 2014). 
182. McMillen v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F.Supp. 2d 699, 703 (N.D. 
Miss. 2010). 
183. See Gulf Pub. Co., Inc., v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 696 (Miss. 1983). 
184. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 13.  
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and held that the school district “ha[d] violated . . . [Constance’s] First 
Amendment rights by denying . . . [her] request to bring her girlfriend as 
her date to the prom.”185  The school district may have been spared a large 
damages award by a group of school parents, who privately organized a 
senior prom to which “all IAHS students, including the plaintiff, are 
welcome and encouraged to attend.”186 
 A similar issue arose the next year in a more southern part of the 
state.  A female lesbian student at Wesson Attendance Center sought to sit 
for her senior yearbook portrait wearing male attire, a tuxedo.  The court’s 
opinion----denying her motion to dismiss—referred the matter to 
mandatory mediation.187  A few years later, Judge Carlton Reeves cited 
McMullen and Sturgis en route to authorizing a same-sex marriage in 
Mississippi.188 
 Many who object to, or are offended by, LGBTQ lifestyles ground 
their views in religion.  This has brought to bear the state’s freedom of 
religion clause which, in relevant part, reads,  
 
[T]he free enjoyment of all religious sentiments . . . shall be 
held sacred.  The rights hereby secured shall not be 
construed to justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals 
or dangerous to the peace and safety of the State, or to 
exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school of the 
state.189 
 
This constitutional text can be applied in differing ways in differing 
contexts by different people. 
 Some (if not most) take the origin of the two sexes back to Genesis. 
The biblical view of man and woman may well be a “religious sentiment” 
that people may freely practice.  On the other hand, the right to pursue 
different LGBTQ lifestyles may be seen as respect for human dignity which 
falls well within the “religious sentiments” of others. Some may find 
sanction for such respect for human dignity190 in the New Testament, which 
 
185. McMillen, 702 F.Supp.2d at 704. Extra-judicial statements on the rights of 
gays and lesbians have been construed as constitutionally protected political speech. 
Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 
1990). 
186. McMillen, 702 F.Supp.2d at 706. 
187. Sturgis v. Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 4351355 (S.D. Miss. 2011).  
188. Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 64 F.Supp.3d 906, 936 (S.D. 
Miss. 2014). 
189. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18. 
190. The late Prof. Myres S. McDougal of Prentiss County, Mississippi and the 
Yale Law School, arguably Mississippi’s greatest Twentieth Century scholar, centered 
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may lead to one use of the Christian Holy Bible which should not be off 
limits in the public schools.191  Past these, reasonable people may disagree 
on just what are “acts of licentiousness” and, assuming that first bridge is 
crossed, upon whether those “acts” are “injurious to morals or dangerous to 
the peace and safety of the State.”  Members of the Itawamba County 
School Board, and, as well, people in the community who opposed allowing 
Constance to attend the senior prom with her girlfriend quite likely are 
among those who view the lesbian lifestyle as involving “acts of 
licentiousness” that are “injurious to morals or dangerous to the peace and 
safety of the State.”  In the end, Section 18 appears to give sanction to that 
wisest view of human interactions that never made its literal way into the 
Holy Bible or other religious texts – Live and Let Live! 
 
XVI. HOME SCHOOLING 
 
 Mississippi has a compulsory school attendance law,192 as noted 
above. Parents are responsible for seeing to it that all children between the 
ages of six and 17 attend school regularly.193  Parents who do not see to it 
that their school age children attend school, as required by law, are subject 
to criminal sanctions.194  The experience-based premise for this compulsory 
school attendance law takes us back to 1817 and statehood.  This state’s 
founders thought “knowledge . . . necessary to good government, the 
preservation of liberty and the happiness of mankind.”195 And so we have 
schools. 
 In its wisdom and experience, and within its constitutional 
authority, the state has learned and legislated that there are multiple means 
of acquiring “knowledge.”  Many of these have been examined above.  Last, 
but not least, for present purposes, the state has authorized “legitimate home 
 
much of his career promoting human dignity as a secular value. See my brief depiction, 
“A Public Order of Human Dignity for All,” published in March 2020, 
https://caba.ms/articles/features/public-order-of-human-dignity-for-all, an abbreviated 
version of which appears below.   
191. See M. B., a minor through Bedi v. Rankin County School Dist., 2015 WL 
5023115 (S.D. Miss. 2015) discussed above. 
192. See Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law, MISS. CODE § 37-13-
91 (2014), et seq.; see particularly §37-13-91(3)(c). See also, a problematic decision 
regarding the county compulsory school attendance officers. In re R. G., 632 So. 2d 953 
(Miss. 1994).  
193. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-91(2)(f), -(3). 
194. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-61, -63. 
195. MISS. CONST. of 1817 art. VI, § 16. 
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instruction program[s].”196  And so we have home school laws.197  A parent, 
guardian or custodian of a child to be home schooled must procure a 
certificate of enrollment issued by the SDE by September 15 of each 
year.198  Without surprise, a home school program may not be “operated or 
instituted for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory 
attendance law.”199 
 Parents build home school curriculums for PreK-12 in Mississippi. 
Suffice it to say that these curricula vary from parent to parent, from child 
to child.  The better means of presenting the history and likely future of 
such “home instruction programs” would be presenting a broad variety of 
individual parent-built curricula, their implementation and their results. 
This would enlarge greatly an exposition which may be arguably too long 
anyway.  Make no mistake about it; home schooling is as legitimate as it is 
important as it is valuable towards the ends of family autonomy and dignity 
and “the happiness of mankind” which have always been enhanced greatly 
by “education,” albeit among many families and for many years home 
instruction was the only means of education available. 
 
XVII. CORNERSTONES OF HUMAN DIGNITY PROPERLY TAUGHT 
 
 At the outset, we named several great teachers who had been born 
and bred in Mississippi.  One of those is Myres Smith McDougal, who 
hailed from rural Prentiss County in the northeastern corner of this state.  
Years ago, Prof. McDougal and a colleague, Harold D.  Lasswell, studied, 
understood, articulated and elaborated eight value-institution cornerstones 
of human dignity that each person on this planet might reasonably aspire 
to.  About half of these are particularly worthy of statement and elaboration 
in connection with a proper education of the maturing children of this state.   
 Prof. McDougal envisioned a public order of human dignity that 
should be taught to all.  As a further anchor, Mac—ever the teacher—
“characterize[d] the social process as human beings interacting with one 
another and with resources.”200 Relevant here and also to be taught in all 
schools is the simple social practice of respect.201 
 
196. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-91(2)(i), -(3)(c), -(9). 
197. Time for Learning, Inc., (last visited, February 3, 2021), available at 
https://www.time4learning.com/homeschooling/mississippi/laws-requirements.html. 
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3). 
199. Id. 
200. Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, Jurisprudence in Policy 
Oriented Perspective, 19 FLA. L. REV. 468, 506 (1966-1967); Robertson, “A Public 
Order of Human Dignity for All,” Capital Area Bar Assn., (posted March 2020), 
https;//caba.ms/articles/features/public-order-of-human=dignity-for-all. 
201. Id.   
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 People value their active participation within and among their 
gender, race, nationality, geography, language, religion and other classes 
and castes. Interest groupings, such as business associations, economic 
councils, classmates, clubs and other more natural classes and castes are 
exemplars of the practices or institutional cornerstones that enable human 
and mutual respect.  A touch or two of humility would enrich the practice 
and experience of respect and self-respect in most any context. 
 Then there is the cornerstone of well-being.202  Well-being includes 
“health, safety and comfort arrangements.”  It is valued because it makes 
so much more possible within a person’s time in this humanity, this 
existence.  Protection of life, liberty and property three prominent and 
invaluable exemplars.  Hospitals, medical clinics, health-plexes, retirement 
homes and other like facilities and services are practical and institutional 
cornerstones that enable well-being and longevity, as are criminal justice, 
including law enforcement, police, public safety and fire protection 
enablers of well-being and thus human dignity. 
 Then there is the cornerstone of affection,203 viz., “family, 
friendship, circles, loyalty.”  Family speaks for itself, along with how much 
of a family, its humanity and longevity one is privileged and fated to enjoy.  
One values friendship both received and given, experiences circles of 
colleagues, acquaintances and passers-by, and each of us cherishes loyalty 
given and experienced.  Practical and institutional cornerstones make each 
more tangible, enriching each, that reciprocal affections may enhance the 
capacity for connection as progenitor of “a public order of human dignity 
on the widest possible scale.” 
   Then there is the cornerstone of rectitude,204 viz., “churches and 
related articulators and appliers of standards of responsible conduct.”  Most 
people have a fair sense of “right and wrong” and even shades of gray, and 
how these inform and nourish the other cornerstones of human dignity.  As 
a public order of human dignity on the widest possible scale is our goal, 
little more need be said here. 
Then there is the cornerstone of enlightenment,205 “mass media, 
research.” 
Education is quickly added here, as a value and a prime exemplar 
of the practice of that dimension of human existence that Mac and his 
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XVIII. EPILOGUE 
 
 One of the more interesting activities within the world of education-
--over the last half century, at least---has been the search for substantial 
alternatives beyond traditional PK-12 public schools.  Background realities 
have included goals set forth in Mississippi’s early constitutions, on the 
aspirational end, and more recent compulsory school attendance laws, on 
the coercive end.  The centerpiece cry increasingly heard has been 
“Choice!” Less overt but nonetheless real is “Fear.”  
And so, we wrap this exposition up with the complementary 
comments of several of our country’s more thoughtful citizens of 
generations past, words as powerful and meaningful in today’s context as 
when first uttered. 
 “But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas---that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace.”206 
But, as noted above, there is also “fear” in the marketplace, as much 
as many might wish it otherwise.  And so it is time for reflecting upon 
Franklin Roosevelt’s wise advice to our country in the early days of the 
Great Depression, that “the only thing we have to fear is---fear itself!”207  
Before Brown and since Alexander, our greatest and most prevalent fear has 
been racial desegregation in public education, though African-Americans 
make up only 38 percent of the state’s population.  The practical problem 
is that for so long so many have insisted on such a super-majority of white 
classmates for their children, with white flight the consequence of these 
parents not getting their way.  Of course, this one is coupled with the fact 
that public school teacher salaries remain unfortunately, if not criminally, 
low.  People fear taxes necessary that MAEP be fully funded in the selfish 
sense that no one likes paying taxes very much.  
Fear is at the cornerstone of the religious issues discussed above.  
This seems odd, as the fearful ones are our less tolerant – some might with 
merit say, less than Christian -- Christians, whose religion remains by far 
the most predominant in the state.  Objections to LGBTQ students in our 
schools are also grounded in fear. Again, why not Live and Let Live?  
And in the context of what seems our second greatest fear---
immigration---again, the battle scarred and thrice near fatally wounded 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., regarding a female pacifist’s application for 
 
206. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
207. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (1933). 
198 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:2 
citizenship, reflected 
 
And recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant’s way, I 
would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to 
make this country what it is, . . . , and that I had not supposed 
hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because 
they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the 
Sermon on the Mount.208 
 
Perhaps we should add these thoughts from Emma Lazurus, so associated 
with our country’s Statue of Liberty. 
 
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses longing 
to breathe free. The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, your tempest-tost to me.  I will lift 
my lamp beside the golden door.209 
 
And teach all of these wise words to our children and their grandchildren. 
Respectfully, history teaches that the foregoing insights are valuable 
in understanding our state’s efforts at educating its people---and 
particularly its children---from 1817, through the recent past, and for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
208. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
209. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883; 1903). 
